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Abstract

The theory of groupthink has been highly beneficial in the study of how groups make
decisions. It has permeated almost every field containing decision making groups.
Despite its popularity, there has been a surprising lack of empirical support for the model.
It is the aim of this paper to suggest a possible explanation for the current state of
groupthink research. First the groupthink model is described briefly, followed by a look
at several selected empirical and case studies of groupthink. A potential reason for the
dearth of empirical is then proposed along with a suggestion for future groupthink
research.
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Introduction

Janis’ (1972, 1982) Groupthink model has been transformatory in the study of
how groups operate and make decisions. Ever since its inception, it has been expanded
beyond its origins, explaining the functioning of policy making groups, and has been
used to analyze the decisions made by pretty much any decision-making group. The
theory has, however, met with criticism. A particular issue that arises when viewing
groupthink research is the lack of empirical support for the phenomenon. Empirical
research has yet to show full or even significant support for groupthink. Furthermore,
studies that offer partial support of the model have been largely inconsistent in which
aspects of the model they support. Qualitative and case study analyses, on the other hand,
have in many cases provided substantial support for the model. Why, then, has it thus far
been impossible to find the same support empirically? One could chalk it up to the
surprising dearth of research on the topic, however, this still doesn’t explain the
inconsistency present in the existing body of empirical evidence. It is the purpose of this
paper to put forth a possible explanation for this discrepancy. In order to do this we must
briefly describe the creation of a groupthink model and its framework. Then it is prudent
to establish the discrepancy between qualitative and quantitative research on the matter
by briefly examining a selection of both empirical and case studies of groupthink. This
will be followed by addressing some criticism of the model and proposing a direction for
future groupthink research.
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Initial Research & The Groupthink Model

The term “groupthink” was first coined by Irving L. Janis in his 1972 book
“Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and
Fiascoes”. For all intents and purposes he is the father of all research on Groupthink.
Janis (a research psychologist at Yale and later a professor at University of California,
Berkeley) was prompted to propose this theory while reading about the Bay of Pigs
Invasion (the Kennedy administration’s failed attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in
Cuba). Janis pondered on how Kennedy and his advisors (an elite group of seemingly
intelligent individuals) could have approved such a flawed plan. This question led him
investigate how groups, even when made of adequately equipped and qualified
individuals, could make bad decisions. To investigate his hypothesis he utilized several
high profile failures of American foreign-policy, namely the Bay of Pigs Invasion, The
Korean War, The Vietnam War and the Attack on Pearl Harbor, although Janis
acknowledged that the phenomenon of groupthink could occur in any situation involving
group decision making. In his own words groupthink can be stated as “a deterioration of
mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group
pressures”.

Through his analysis of the aforementioned case studies, Janis noticed 6 issues
that could possibly contribute to a group’s failure to make good decisions. These were as
follows: 1. Only exploring a limited range of possible solutions 2. A failure to critically
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re-evaluate a solution that was chosen by the majority 3. Failure to re-evaluate initially
rejected solutions 4. Little to no effort ro get expert opinions on the pros and cons of a
particular course of action 5. A bias towards selecting information that backs up their
chosen solution and 6. No deliberation on possible roadblocks that could hinder said
solution. Janis saw these six behaviors as key hindrances to making good group
decisions. These behaviors were generalized into 8 “symptoms” or warning signs of
groupthink.
1. A false sense of invincibility among members that leads to dangerous
levels of optimism and risk taking
2. Mutual attempts to discredit potential issues and justify the chosen course
of action
3. Undoubting belief in the ethicality of the group that leads members to
disregard potential ethical consequences of group decisions
4. Negative view of opposing groups such that less aggressive responses
seem ineffective
5. Pressure on any dissenting members
6. Self-censorship of any contradictory thoughts or actions
7. An illusion of concurrency with the decision of the majority, largely due
to self-censorship
8. Active repression of contradictory information by members of the group to
preserve the sanctity of the group (termed “mindguards” by Janis)

6

WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED

These eight symptoms, when present can serve as strong predictors of ineffective group
decision making.

It should be noted at this point that there is a very fine line between beneficially
cohesive groups and conditions that could result in groupthink. Janis acknowledged that
cohesive groups can in many cases can be far more effective than an individual when it
comes to making decisions, however highly cohesive groups are also very susceptible to
the occurrence of groupthink. In response, Janis suggested several measures that could
possibly counteract the effect of groupthink

Preventing Groupthink

Janis proposed three primary methods of countering the effects of groupthink. They are
as follows:
1. Leaders of a group should encourage every member to critically evaluate all
decisions and voice any concerns they might have. Furthermore, the leader must
be willing to accept said criticism as well if they pertain to his/her judgements.
2. When assigning a task to a group one must be careful not let expectations of the
outcome influence the decisions of the group. Therefore, when stating the issue
which is to be tackled, it is best to do it in an impartial manner, merely stating the
facts.
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3. Multiple independent groups should be set up to tackle the same issue, each with
its own separate leader.
These three practices in theory should help combat the effects of groupthink, but also
create other issues of their own. Allowing critical evaluation of every decision made by a
group is a time intensive process and is not practical in matters that might necessitate a
rapid response. Furthermore, constant criticism could lead to a deterioration in the
relationship among group members. Being impartial in explaining an issue and
withholding information on expected outcomes might lead to a conflict between the
leader and the members of the group. Having several groups work on the same issue
seems rather wasteful and labor intensive and also limits the responsibility felt by each
individual group. Janis therefore prescribed several more methods of fighting groupthink
based on the generalized “symptoms”, dealing with the issue of group insulation in
particular. He notes, however, that said techniques could diminish group cohesiveness as
a result. They are as follows:
● During the review of alternatives, it may be beneficial for the group to break into
subgroups under separate leaders and then come back together to discuss their
findings.
● Every group member should discuss the group’s decisions and deliberations with
a colleague who is not a member of the group and make note of their responses.
● Qualified individuals outside of the group should be periodically invited to group
discussions in order question and test the views held by the group.
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In addition to these points, Janis made additional ones to tackle issues resulting from
leadership bias.
● At least one member of the group should play the role of the devil’s advocate, this
operates on the same principle as Janis’ first method of countering groupthink but
is somewhat more practical.
● In decisions dealing with an opposing organization, an adequate amount of time
should be devoted to analysing alternative courses of action that the opponent
could take.
● After reaching an initial consensus on a course of action, the group should allow
any remaining concerns about said course of action to be voiced and allow a
re-evaluation of the plan.
Janis’ notes that all of these are only partial solutions to countering groupthink and must
be used with caution lest they cause new issues of their own. Furthermore, Janis suggests
that members of policy-making groups be educated on the concept of groupthink so as to
better counteract its effects

Revision and Expansion: An Update of the Groupthink Model

In 1982, Janis created a revised and expanded model of groupthink in his book
Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. The resulting model
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was far clearer and easier to understand. Janis distinctly describes, in their order of
occurrence, the antecedent conditions, symptoms and consequences of groupthink. These
conditions can be split into three groups, the first being the cardinal condition (group
cohesion, which is necessary for the occurrence of groupthink), followed by structural
faults and situational factors (both of which consist of “additional” antecedent conditions
which increase the likelihood of groupthink but are not essential to its occurrence) The
antecedent conditions as laid out by Janis are as follows:
1. A high degree of group cohesiveness.  This is what Janis sees as the most
important antecedent condition. Janis notes that incohesive groups can also fall
victim to bad decision making, albeit for reasons other than groupthink. Without
this condition, groupthink cannot occur.
2. Insulation of the group. This is the first of what Janis refers to as structural faults,
issues with the way the group operates. These conditions are not necessary for the
occurrence of groupthink, like group cohesion, but will certainly increase the
likelihood that it will occur. Insulation refers to the isolation of the group from
outsiders who could provide useful insight or different perspectives during the
decision making process.
3. Absence of unbiased leadership. A strong and influential leader who does not
utilize an unbiased style of leadership can easily exhibit a degree of influence on
the decisions made by his or her group. In effect, this refers to a failure to adhere
to a leadership style encouraging critical evaluation and inquiry and reliance on
more authoritarian forms of leadership.
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4. Dearth of framework for systematic decision making procedure. This factor in
particular denotes the lack of a clearly delineated system used to make decisions,
which could potentially counteract the effects of groupthink.
5. Homogeneity of social and ideological characteristics of members. This factor, as
well as the previous three structural factors, represent the absence of possible
preventative measure to combat groupthink. If group members are homogeneous
in the way they think, they are less likely to discuss and suggest divergent views.
6. High stress resulting from external threats. T
 his factor highlights the important
role played by stress in the groupthink model. However, there is a caveat to this
factor in that high stress alone does not necessarily result in groupthink (examples
provided by Janis suggest that it could even have the opposite effect). For stress to
play a role in causing groupthink, a low degree of faith in finding an alternate
solution must also be present.
7. Low self esteem among group members. T
 he final antecedent condition focuses on
the role played by internal stress (as opposed to the external stress in the previous
factor). This internal stress leads to low levels of self esteem and occurs due to A)
recent bad outcomes of decisions/failed decisions, B) perception of incompetency
among members at tackling the complex decisions that must be made and C)
moral dilemma resulting from a need to make urgent and critical decision.
These antecedent conditions lead to a tendency for concurrency-seeking.
Concurrency-seeking as per Janis is the underlying mechanism of groupthink.
Concurrence-seeking refers to the response of the group to both internal and external

11

WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED

stressors in hopes of maintaining the emotional composure of the group. This process
results in the occurrence of groupthink defined by the eight symptoms of groupthink
briefly described below:
1. Illusion of Invulnerability. T
 his leads to an dangerous level of optimism and
advocates sever risk taking.
2. Undisputed belief in morality of the group. This leads to ignorance of the ethical
or moral consequences of the group’s choices.
3. Rationalization. This is done by members of the group as a collective in order to
dismiss any threats to the group’s chosen course of action.
4. Stereotypical perception of opposition. Oppositional groups and/or individuals are
perceived as incompetent and/or morally inferior.
5. Self-Censorship. This is done by individual members of the group to suppress any
doubts or concerns they might have regarding the decisions being made.
6. Collective perception of agreement. Group share an illusion of accord with the
decision made by the majority of the group, this could be due to self-censorship.
7. Pressure on dissenters. Any member who challenges the consensus of the group
is shown that this is not the expected behavior of a loyal group member.
8. Appearance of mindguards. Certain members of the group might assign
themselves the selective role of a “mindguard” and actively control and even
repress threatening information.
The symptoms can also be arranged into three types, namely overestimations, closed
mindedness and pressures towards uniformity. Overestimations comprises the first 2
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symptoms (illusion of invulnerability and undisputed beliefs in group morality), closed
mindedness refers to the following 2 symptoms (rationalization and stereotyped views of
the opposition) and pressures towards uniformity deals with the final 4 symptoms
(self-censorship, collective perception of agreement pressure on dissenters and the
appearance of mindguards). These symptoms of groupthink serve as predictors for the
consequences of groupthink. Janis also referred to these consequences as defects in
decision making resulting from groupthink. They are as follows:
1. Insufficient analysis of alternate courses of action
2. Inadequate discussion of group objectives
3. Failure to explore and discuss the consequences of the initial course of action
4. Deficient exploration of information that could influence decisions
5. Failure to reevaluate rejected courses of action
6. Biased processing of available information
7. Lack of effort devoted to planning for contingencies
A visual depiction of the groupthink model in its entirety is attached in the appendix
(Figure 1). It details each category of the model as well the causal sequencing of factors,
allowing a clear understanding of what Janis theorized.
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Groupthink Beyond American Foreign Policy

While Janis may have focused solely on American foreign policy fiascoes when
developing the theory of groupthink, he acknowledges that groupthink can occur in other
contexts as well. Notable ones that he mentions are French military leaders and their
reliance on the defences of the Maginot line in World War II, Neville Chamberlain’s
administration’s policy of “peace” and ignorance of the growing German threat in the late
1930s, the Aberfan disaster of 1966 and the Thalidomide Birth Defects Scandal.

Another important study that served to expand the horizons of the applications of
the groupthink theory was Eaton (2001). Eaton applied Janis’ groupthink theory to two
high profile business debacles that rocked the British markets in the mid to late 1990s.
The two firms involved were Marks & Spencers, a leading multinational retailer based
out of the UK, and British Airways. It is interesting to note that in both cases the issues
arose as a result of the company pursuing a rapid globalization strategy. Eaton notes
Janis’ lack of attention to cases of groupthink outside of foreign policy, but also states
that applying the concept to the realm of corporations doesn’t require significant
modification of the original theory. In his own words, “managerial thought” and practices
have changed since 1972 and, due to the prevalence of the concept of corporate “culture”,
there has been more significance attached to reaching consensus. Furthermore, he notes
two factors that could have been overlooked by Janis, citing evidence from two earlier
articles. These factors are the amount of influence or power a leader has over his/her
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subordinates (Flowers, 1977) and acceptance of a convention put forth by a powerful
leader (McCauley, 1989). In order to apply the theory to his chosen case studies, Eaton
utilized content analysis of press reports (mainly from The Guardian a nd The
Independent) during the period of 1994-1999. He paid special attention to sentences or
themes that related to the key symptoms of groupthink. There is an inherent level of
subjectivity in this method, which Eaton acknowledged, but he states that the primary
purpose of the search was to find statements that clearly indicated a dangerously high
level of consensus.

Case Study Analyses of Groupthink

By and large, the main body of research in support of Janis’ (1972,1982)
Groupthink model has come from qualitative and case studies such as Eaton (2001). In
order to get a better understanding of the model, the following section will detail several
notable studies in the field in an attempt to better illustrate the theory as well as highlight
the differences between qualitative and empirical research on Groupthink. The selection
of studies for this paper is based on Park (2000), which offered a detailed overview of
research pertaining to groupthink.

Manz & Sims (1982) was another attempt to extend the groupthink model into a
business context. In particular the researchers looked at autonomous work groups based
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at a manufacturing plant in the US. The work groups at the plant ranged in size from 3-19
members. Each group was run by an elected leader, who received additional
compensation along with increased responsibility. These work groups often had to deal
with abstract situations involving everything from quality control to production or
personnel problems. The group leaders arranged weekly meetings to discuss the
problems, and also occasionally invited upper management to attend. Manz & Sims used
three cases taken from these weekly meetings in order to illustrate Groupthink in action.
The first case dealt with a discussion regarding a change in the shift schedule. It had been
suggested that the shifts be moved to earlier in the day so that workers would be able to
leave around early to mid afternoon. The group leader started out by noting that no one
had spoken out against the keeping the current shift schedule in a previous meeting,
thereby clearly illustrating both partial leadership and the illusion of unanimity. The one
dissenter who advocated for the change in shift schedules was pressured by the group
leader as well as the majority to capitulate. Self-censorship was also seen in the previous
meeting, only one member openly voiced dissent despite numerous members showing
clear nonverbal cues that they disagreed with the decisions being made. The second case
dealt with a situation involving a quality control work group. During the discussion, a
member noted that the group had been receiving a large number of complaints. The
resulting discussion of this issue exhibited several signs of Groupthink. The group
discovered that the source of complaints was a production work group that was unhappy
with quality control for drawing out the quality evaluation process and causing a fall in
productivity. A majority of the discussion centered around support for the group, backing
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up the perception that they were not to blame for these issues and that the complaints
were unwarranted. This was interpreted as indicative of rationalization and stereotyped
views of the production workgroup (the opposition). The third and final case was based
on the discussions of another production work group regarding another quality control
issue. During this discussion the upper management liaison to the group was also present
at the meeting, soon after the discussion began he quickly took charge and stated what he
thought the correct course of action should be. This is another clear violation of impartial
leadership and thereby a contributing factor to Groupthink. Symptoms of groupthink seen
in this case include self-censorship, seen on the part of the group members who showed
nonverbal cues of disagreement despite not voicing said disagreement, and the illusion of
unanimity on the part of the external liaison, a result of the self-censorship carried out by
the work group members.

One of the strongest sources of support for groupthink phenomenon comes from
Hensley & Griffin (1984). This paper applies the model to the crisis that faced the board
of trustees of Kent State University during the period of 1976 to 1977, utilizing a case
study analysis as well as interviews with key figures involved in the crisis. The crisis was
centered around the construction of an addition to the school’s gymnasium. The location
chosen for the new addition was also the site of the infamous Kent State Massacre in
1970, an event which involved the national guard killing four students and wounding
numerous others. The selection of this site was met by immense backlash from students,
faculty and even third parties such as state and national politicians. Despite the immense
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pressure to capitulate and choose a different site, the majority of the trustees stuck to their
original decision throughout. Hensley & Griffin found evidence for nearly every facet of
the groupthink model, from antecedent conditions to defects in decision making in their
analysis of this case. Evidence for Janis’ cardinal antecedent of group cohesion comes
from their social relationships within the group and the prestige resulting from
membership. An analysis of voting records from prior meetings also showed a tendency
towards unanimous decisions. Structural faults were evidenced by the lack of student or
faculty representation in the board (evidence of insulation), evidence of unanimous and
undisputed decision making (lack of impartial leadership), a lack of structure in the
process of decision making and a shared social background (homogeneity of members).
Situational context factors included immense external pressure from students, faculty and
outsiders, and low self esteem (resulting from the board of trustees having to deal with
the power vacuum left by the departure of the previous president). The refusal by the
board to allow the use of external mediators hinted at concurrence seeking tendencies and
thereby opening up the case for interpretation as per the symptoms of groupthink. Illusion
of invulnerability can be seen in the trustees dismissal of the threat posed by student
protestors as well as a notion that they could tackle any problem they were faced with.
Feelings of inherent group morality are visible in the way that the trustees viewed the
conflict as a battle between right and wrong. Hensley & Griffin suggest that the trustees
underwent four main collective rationalizations, 1) the participation of students in the
selection process, 2) oppositions to the site was not on the same level as the trustees
decision, 3) no other options existed and 4) the site was just a symbol for a deeper
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conflict. Support for the symptom of stereotypes of the opposition is flimsy at best as
there is no evidence that they viewed the student and faculty coalition as incompetent,
although there is evidence to suggest that they saw them as morally base. Self-censorship
was seen by the fact that several members were conflicted in their support of the site but
still voted with the majority. Three of the nine members of the board were openly in
disagreement with the decisions of the board, so there is no solid evidence suggesting an
illusion of unanimity. Dissenters saw harsh repercussions, and discussion often became
heated and emotional when dissent was introduced. Several members of the board did
engage in mind guarding as well by blocking potentially relevant information form
discussions. Evidence also exists for all eight defects of decision, except the failure to
plan for contingencies which the board had carried out multiple times. While it must be
noted that this case did not perfectly support the groupthink model, it did meet all the
requirements posited by Janis (1982), thereby strongly hinting at the existence of
groupthink. The outcome may not have been a “fiasco” on the same scale as those
described by Janis, but the costs were still high and clearly avoidable. Furthermore,
Hensley & Griffin do advocate for the addition of some additional factors such as a
failure to communicate with the opposition, refusal to work with mediators and refusal to
postpone or prolong the decision making process.

McCauley (1989) revisits the cases analyzed by Janis (1972, 1982) paying special
attention to the role played by compliance. Compliance (public agreement coupled with
private disagreement), as per McCauley, plays a separate role when compared to
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cohesion. McCauley disagrees with Janis’ assertion that compliance will decrease with
group cohesion (compliance will give way to internalization instead). Cohesion in the
context of groupthink refers to attraction to the group and the desire to continue being a
member. McCauley notes that cohesion and compliance need not go hand in hand.
Particularly, one might feel so certain of group support that they see no need to comply.
He then goes on to state that the structural and situational antecedent conditions, in
addition to increasing cohesion, may also increase compliance. To support this he cites
the examples of lack of impartial leadership which he says is, in essence, the setting of
norms, lack of decision making framework is akin to a lack of norms that might counter
those set by the leader and member homogeneity will limit differences in opinion. To
support his idea of compliance’s role, McCauley revisits case studies in Janis (1982). In
the Bay of Pigs case, he states that evidence for compliance lies in the different
explanations of what occured. Janis’ explanation states that the policy group had reached
a high level of cohesion but wasn’t at a stage where the individual members could be
completely frank. Another explanation hypothesizes that, like many politicians, the
members of the group were afraid of losing status if they objected. A common thread in
the explanations is the presence of self-censorship. Janis states that the members of the
policy group, who were all highly educated and revered politicians would be unlikely to
simply comply. McCauley, however, points out that such interpretations are highly
subjective, and that evidence does not point towards internalization. McCauley makes an
important distinction here, doubts in terms of the decision outcome are not evidence of
compliance, however, doubts relating to whether or not the decision is right are.
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McCauley goes on to analyze the rest of the case studies most of which he interprets as
being groupthink without the influence of compliance save for the escalation of the
Vietnam War which, like the Bay of Pigs, contains evidence pointing towards
compliance. Since only two out of the six case studies support the compliance theory, it is
difficult to say that the antecedents of groupthink serve as antecedents of compliance.
Therefore, it is also not prudent to say that the two are inextricably linked. Nonetheless,
McCauley draws attention to a flaw in the groupthink model. It is interesting to note that
in many empirical studies, the measure of self-censorship is typically linked with
compliance in that members may publicly agree, but share other sentiments privately.

Moorhead et al (1991) applies the groupthink model to a more recent event, the
Challenger Disaster of 1986. The analysis of the flight readiness meeting prior to the
launch of the shuttle reveals a clear presence of groupthink. Antecedent conditions, such
as a failure to meet directly with the engineers to discuss concerns that were brought up
(insulation), were present. This led to symptoms of groupthink such as stereotyped views
of the engineers (the opposition) and defects in decision making, such as the assertion
that the shuttle would either launch on the given day or not launch at all (few
alternatives). Overall, the case exhibits all the necessary factors in the groupthink model.
Key takeaways from this study include the researchers assertions that two more factors
must be added to the groupthink model. These factors are time and leadership (advocated
a more significant emphasis on its role), both of which are important in this case. Time
constraints were relevant because the launch was already facing delays, and the
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committee was trying to prevent further such delays in order to save face in front of the
politicians. Leadership is already included in the model, but Moorhead et al advocated for
it to play a much bigger role and serve as a necessary precondition like group cohesion.

Moorhead & Neck (1992) provided yet another application of the theory of
groupthink, this time in the judicial system looking at the trial of famous businessman
and cocaine trafficker, John Delorean. In this case, all the antecedent conditions were
present among the jury members yet groupthink was avoided. In effect, the jury group did
not exhibit the symptoms of groupthink. The researchers chalk this up to the use of
structured decision making procedures. Three components of methodical decision making
are put forth. These are procedures for exploring alternatives, searching for information
and allowing for democratic leadership. This study is useful in that it expands Janis’
(1972, 1982) idea of using procedure to prevent groupthink, allowing it to be more easily
applied.

Empirical Studies of Groupthink

Janis (1972) offered no empirical support for his concept of Groupthink. Instead,
he utilized an analysis of past foreign policy “fiascoes” to offer support for his theory.
This lack of experimental evidence has led to skepticism as to the validity of Groupthink,
a skepticism that Janis failed to address. The burden of empirical proof has therefore
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fallen on the research community. Many have attempted to investigate the phenomenon,
and notable/significant attempts to do so will be briefly detailed in the following section

Flowers (1977) was the first attempt to empirically support Janis’ theory of
groupthink, occurring only 5 years after Janis first proposed the concept. Flowers’ study
utilized a 2 x 2 factorial design with the two independent variables being leadership style
(closed or open) and group cohesiveness (high or low), both of which were factors Janis
considered integral to the occurrence of Groupthink. Outcome variables included the
number of solutions suggested and the use of facts provided. The sample was composed
of 120 college students from Indiana and Syracuse Universities. These students were split
into 40 groups consisting of 3 members and a leader (who received special training). The
training consisted of the leaders being given a set of instructions corresponding to either
the “open” or “closed” leadership styles. “Open” leaders were told to not make their
personal opinion known until the rest of the members had done so, encourage adequate
discussion of each possible solution and emphasize the importance of taking all
viewpoints into consideration. “Closed” leaders, on the other hand, were told to state their
preference before beginning the discussion, not encourage dialogue of each and every
possible solution and emphasize the importance of consensus on the group’s decision.
Group cohesion was manipulated by either ensuring the group members were strangers or
asking the leader to recruit his/her acquaintances as members of his group. The groups
met and their discussions were recorded for later analysis. The members of each group
were assigned a role in order to rapidly acclimate them with the case study they were
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presented. The case study given to the groups was a made up personnel issue facing a
school board. It was designed in order to present elements that were common to the case
studies presented by Janis. These were controversy (there is no clear “best” answer),
aspect of morality (concerned the fate of other individuals), time dependent crisis (a
decision was required immediately), competition with hostile/outside group and a lack of
complete shared knowledge (some facts were withheld and only given to members
playing a specific role). The groups were told to reach a decision within 30 mins and
upon completion (finding a solution that everyone agreed upon) were given an individual
questionnaire assessing pre and post -discussion consensus, perception of freedom to
speak out, willingness to do a similar activity with the same group in the future and
attractiveness of the group (in terms of being interesting, engaging and enjoyable). The
tapes were analyzed by judges who were kept unaware of the experiment’s purposes in
order to ensure that the rules of the experiment were followed by all participants. Further
analysis of the answers to the questionnaire revealed some telling results. Regardless of
the cohesiveness of the groups, there was a main effect of leadership style on the outcome
variables of # of solutions proposed and use of facts. In other words, groups which had
closed leaders saw fewer solutions proposed and fewer facts utilized, both signs that
could indicate groupthink. On the other hand there was an almost negligible effect of
cohesiveness on both outcome variables. This directly contradicts Janis’ assumption of
the essential nature of cohesiveness in the groupthink model. Flowers offers several
potential explanations for this issue. It is possible that the way the leadership styles were
designed could have caused them to potentially reduce the observed effect attributed to

24

WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED

cohesiveness of the groups. Flowers also notes several key differences between the
cohesiveness in the experiment and the cohesiveness in Janis’ “fiascoes”. The
perpetrators in Janis’ case studies had relationships which had existed for a much longer
period of time with the fellow group members as well as existing on both professional
and social levels. Flowers also acknowledges the differences in the situations attributed to
importance, magnitude, group size, etc, as well as suggesting that Janis had omitted a
potentially relevant variable, the degree of power the leader has over the rest of the
members. Flowers suggested that adding power as a factor in the groupthink model might
strengthen the case for groupthink.

Courtright (1978) was another early attempt to investigate the groupthink
phenomenon in a laboratory setting. The study utilized a 2 x 3 design. The independent
variables were group cohesion and what Courtright described as strict parameters set by
the group leader in relation to acceptable solutions, referred to as the induction of
parameters. It should be noted here that a major shortcoming of this study was the
omission of the third factor Janis noted as important for predicting groupthink, the
blocking of potentially relevant outside information. Instead of manipulating this variable
as well, as was attempted in Flowers (1977), Courtright chose to make all relevant
information available to all groups regardless of experimental condition. Outcome
variables consisted of the number of possible solutions proposed by every member, the
number of statements of agreement per member and the number of statements of
disagreement per member. Group cohesion was manipulated via the use of a
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pre-experimental discussion on an unrelated topic. Following this discussion participants
in low cohesion groups were assigned to new groups to carry out the actual experiment
whereas high cohesion groups remained together. Induction of parameters was
manipulated via instructions provided to groups. The groups were split into three separate
conditions on this basis. The instructions issued were related to the amount of time the
group had to solve the issue presented to them, Courtright considered using a group
leader to accomplish this manipulation but felt that doing so resulted in other issues,
specifically the members’ perception of the leader (who would have to be selected by the
experimenter as there was insufficient time for a “natural” leader to arise). In the first
condition (the “freed” condition) participants were told that the time given was more than
adequate and emphasis was placed on coming up with a large number of solutions. In the
second condition (the “limited” condition) participants were told that the time allotted
was inadequate and emphasis was placed on consensus rather than discussion. The third
and final condition was given no specific instructions aside from being informed of the
time available for discussion; they served as the control condition. The sample consisted
of 96 freshmen enrolled in speech and composition classes at the University of Iowa. The
participants were split up into groups of 4 and, following the pre-experimental process,
were either reassigned to new groups or remained in the same group depending on
whether they were assigned to a low or high cohesion condition. The groups were then
given a questionnaire in order to check their levels of cohesion. In order to strengthen the
cohesion variable, members of high cohesion groups were told that their results showed
that they were highly compatible. Members of low cohesion groups were told that it was
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not possible to find the most compatible group for them and they were therefore
randomly assigned. The groups were then given the case study which they attempted to
solve (“What is the best method of recruiting new students to the University of Iowa?”)
as well as their specific instructions (based on induction of parameters condition). The
groups were given 25 minutes to come up with a solution. Video recordings of each
groups’ discussion underwent content analysis by unbiased independent graders. The
solutions proposed by each group were also graded according to the Leathers
Productivity Rating Instrument. The results showed that the manipulation of group
cohesion had produced a significant difference in the perception of cohesion among
participants. In addition, groups in the high cohesiveness limited condition showed far
fewer statements of disagreement (which can be seen as indicative of groupthink).
Results relating to the quality of solutions proposed were not significant, however, the
importance of this parameter may be overestimated as Janis (1972) noted that groupthink
need not always result in bad decisions being made. Courtright sees the results as
supportive of his two goals, namely to test the accuracy of Janis’ theory and gauge its
ability to be tested empirically. However, the only significant outcome variable was the
statements of disagreement, which Courtright contends to be indicative of groupthink.
Therefore, evidence in this particular study can be seen as somewhat lacking. It should
also be noted that the results directly contradict those of Flowers (1977), who could not
show a significant effect of cohesiveness on groupthink symptoms. In addition some
experimental issues such as the omission of several potentially important variables and
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low interrater reliability necessitate that we view the results of this study with a grain of
salt.

Callaway & Esser (1984) built upon the findings of Flowers (1977) and
Courtright (1978). Their study utilized a 2 x 2 factorial design with cohesiveness and
procedure as the independent variables. The outcome variables were responses to a
questionnaire designed to measure cohesiveness on the basis of several factors (such as
willingness to participate in a similar activity with the same group in the future, ability of
the group, effectiveness of the experimenter in creating groups) and performance on two
tasks (the “horse trader task” and “lost at sea task”) aimed at measuring decision quality.
Similar to previous studies, analysis was carried out via tape recordings of the
discussions. Cohesiveness was manipulated using a method akin to the one utilized by
Courtright (1978). Participants were given a questionnaire prior to the experiment that
supposedly assessed their personality. On the basis of this dummy questionnaire, they
were told they were either matched (high cohesiveness) or that the experimenter had been
unable to match them (low cohesiveness) with their fellow group members. Procedure
was manipulated via written instructions provided to the groups. Groups in the procedure
present conditions were issued these instructions which highlighted several important
factors for good decision making (such as exploration of all possible solutions,
willingness to question possible decisions). Those in the procedure absent condition were
issued no instructions. The cohesiveness manipulation showed significant results, with
groups in the high cohesion condition rating themselves higher on the post experimental
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questionnaire. There were, however, no significant results in terms of decision quality. In
order to get a more accurate picture, the experimenters carried out a second round of
analyses by dividing the groups into three categories (low, medium and high) based on
summed cohesiveness scores. This second round of analysis showed a significant main
effect of group cohesion on the lost at sea task, with high cohesion groups scoring higher
(indicative of a poor decision in this case) than the other two conditions. Notably,
medium cohesion groups scored lowest in this task, suggesting that a moderate amount of
cohesion might lead to better decision making. Further scrutiny of the questionnaire and
recordings revealed fewer statements of disagreement in the high cohesion groups as well
as higher ratings of confidence. The higher ratings of confidence, in particular, could
denote evidence for Janis’ first symptom of groupthink, a false sense of invincibility
among group members that results in high levels of risk taking and over-optimism. The
horse trader task showed no significant results, although the experimenters note that this
task may not be indicative of the type of situation that could lead to groupthink as there is
only one correct solution to the task (Janis stated that situations that could result in
groupthink would have many possible solutions). There also seems to be a mixed effect
in relation to the procedure manipulation, contradictory to the results of Flowers (1977)
who carried out a similar manipulation via leadership style. A possible explanation for
this could be the weaker manipulation carried out in this study, Flowers and Courtright
both utilized conditions in which factors influencing good decision making were
encouraged and discouraged, whereas Callaway and Esser only included a condition in
which such practices were encouraged.
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Leana (1985) replicated the study carried out by Flowers (1977) in light of
revisions made to the groupthink theory by Janis (1982). The study used a 2 x 2 factorial
design with leadership style (directive or participative) and cohesiveness (high or low) as
independent variables. The sample was composed of 208 undergraduate students. A key
difference in this study from Flowers is that groups in the cohesive condition were made
from students who had worked in the same groups for class projects over the course of a
semester. Participants in the non-cohesive condition were randomly assigned to groups.
Non-cohesive groups had a randomly selected leader, whereas cohesive groups were
issued a questionnaire a couple of weeks prior to the study to assess which member of
group was perceived to have the most influence. This individual was then chosen as
group leader. Leaders assigned to the participative condition were told to follow
procedures that counteract groupthink (stating their preference last, encouraging
exploration of all alternatives). Directive leaders were told to enact behaviors that would
increase likelihood of groupthink (state their preference first, emphasize coming to a
decision quickly). Just as in Flowers, each member of the group was assigned a particular
role and given specific information relating to that role which was not made available to
the rest of the group. The groups were all given the same situation in which they had to
choose an employee (out of 6) to lay off. Manipulation checks were carried out on the
independent variables (cohesion and leadership style). Cohesive groups had higher scores
of group attraction and participative leaders had members with a higher perceived
freedom of expression, thereby confirming that both manipulations had been successful.
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An additional manipulation check was carried out on the leadership variable by gauging
the leader’s influence in reaching their respective group’s final decision. This check
showed that directive leaders had more influence on group decisions and that differences
between cohesive (“elected”) and non-cohesive (“appointed”) group leaders were not
significant. The outcome variable of decision processes was split into several separate
parts. On the first part, self-censorship. There was no significant effect on self censorship
between directive and participative leaders however, there was a noticeable and
statistically significant effect in terms of group cohesion. Interestingly, the results here
contradict Janis’ (1982, 1972) theory; groups with high cohesion showed less self
censorship than those with low cohesion. The next portion of the theory to be analyzed
was selective bias in processing of information available. Analysis here was carried out
by listening to tape recordings of the discussions and identifying instances of information
being given to groups after a decision was made. This could be interpreted as an attempt
to bolster support for the decision that the group had agreed upon. However, no
significant effects could be seen here. The next metric was the number of solutions
proposed and discussed by each group. Mirroring the results of Flowers’ study, no
difference was seen between cohesive and non cohesive groups. Participative leaders,
however, on average had more proposed solutions than directive ones. Risks and
reappraisal were the final two factors to be analyzed, but showed no significant effects.
Leana notes that this and the results seen for selective biases might be a result of the time
constraint. Analysis of the decisions themselves and the questionnaire revealed that,
despite going along with the decision, members of groups in the directive leader
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condition often did not agree with the final decision made by the group. In summary, the
study reiterated the findings of Flowers (1977) in relation to the influence of leadership
style on groupthink. The contradiction of results in relation to group cohesion, however,
seems startling. Leana states that this could possibly be due to the fact that the members
of the high cohesion groups may be more comfortable with each other and therefore be
more willing to speak their mind. An important attribute she notes here is the
interweaving of task oriented groups and experience of working with fellow members,
both of which could be attributes that contribute to the results seen. She suggests that
future studies separate these two to more clearly determine which one is responsible.

Gladstein and Reilly (1985) analyzed a different component of Janis’ (1972,
1982) Groupthink model, the role played by external threat. The researchers hypothesized
that the existence of an external threat could limit information processing as well as
create a bias towards a presiding decision. In order to test this theory, they utilized a
management simulation known as Tycoon. The Tycoon simulation, which took place
over the course of 6 days, consisted of participants choosing a company (each with its
own unique characteristics) via a bidding war and then proceeding to run and manage all
aspects of said company. A key part of this simulation was the the ability of the
researchers to institute external events such as natural disasters, major government policy
changes and even terrorism. These events played the role of external threats to the
decision making group. Time pressure was also manipulated by cutting the allotted
decision making time from 3 hours to 45 minutes halfway through the simulation. The

32

WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED

sample was composed of MBA students at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
University enrolled in a business policy class. One hundred and twenty eight students
were used in the study and were formed into 24 groups (each representing a company)
consisting of 5 to 6 people. A 2 x 2 factorial design was utilized with the two dependent
variables being impact of the external event (high or low) and time pressure (high and
low). The events were classified as high or low impact based on the financial
consequences resulting from the event. The order of high impact and low impact events
was randomized for each group so that all groups went through all four experimental
conditions. Dependent variables were measured using a questionnaire filled out at the end
of a decision making period which assessed information processing as well as loss of
control. Results of the study showed that increased external threat resulted in restricted
information processing and higher levels of stress. Increased time pressure, however, did
not seem to produce conclusive results across the measures of information processing.
The researchers hypothesized that even though one might assume that a decrease in time
would result in less information processing, it might instead lead to more efficient
information processing. There was no evidence to support that loss of control correlated
with threat or time pressure. While not explicitly testing groupthink, this study is still
useful in that it tests a facet of the model that hasn’t seen much research. It must also be
noted that even though the researchers did not control cohesion, participants were
permitted to self select into their groups meaning that cohesion could very well have
played a role in some of the results seen.
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Callaway, Marriott and Esser (1985) also took a different approach when testing
the groupthink hypothesis, looking particularly at the role played by dominance exhibited
by group members.In addition, the researchers also wanted to test Janis’ (1972)
suggestion that concurrence seeking occurred in order to reduce levels of stress.
Dominance in this case was defined as a tendency to “argue, persuade and influence
others” as well as a tendency to play the role of leader. The sample was comprised of 112
students recruited from lower-level psychology classes, formed into 28 groups of 4. The
study used a 2 x 2 factorial design, with dominance and presence of decision making
procedures. The dependent variables were decision quality , measured via the Lost at Sea
task used in Callaway and Esser (1984), and process measures, obtained via analysis of
the recordings of group discussions alongside a set of post experimental questionnaires.
Prior to being formed into groups, these students were given a questionnaire meant to
assess the level of dominance trait in their personality. They were classified as either low
or high dominance via the use of a median split. Group cohesion was held constant by
telling participants that the questionnaire had been used to match them with their fellow
group members, thereby attempting to simulate high group cohesion. The presence of
procedure was manipulated by telling groups in the procedure present condition
guidelines for good decision making. Results showed that high dominance groups had
higher quality decisions, used more discussion time, had more statements of
disagreement and agreement, and had lower levels of state anxiety. Procedures present
groups used less discussion time. The study thereby provided support for the stress
reduction hypothesis of groupthink. Results for the utilization of procedures (which
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should combat groupthink) were inconclusive however. The researchers note that,
especially in the case of low dominance groups, personal accountability may be
necessary in order to effectively carry out a good decision making procedure.

Moorhead and Montanari (1986) presents a comprehensive test of the groupthink
phenomenon in light of the slightly revised and more clearly stated model of groupthink
in Janis (1982). The particularly focuses on the causal sequence put forth by Janis, with
antecedents leading to symptoms and so on. Moorhead and Montanari initially comment
on several previous Groupthink studies, namely Flowers (1977), Courtright (1978) and
Leana (1985). They state that the issues with these studies, in particular Flowers (1977)
and Courtright (1978), are that they failed to create the necessary antecedents for
groupthink to occur. In particular, they failed to accurately recreate the cohesiveness
described by Janis (1972, 1982). Furthermore they note that Courtright’s study, while
attempting to be comprehensive, still only managed to account for only two of the
antecedent conditions and only three of the defects in decision making. To this accord,
Moorhead and Montanari sought to create an inclusive test of groupthink phenomenon.
They began by searching for scales relevant to the variables present in the groupthink
model, but were only able to find measures pertaining to cohesion. Therefore, scales for
the other seven antecedent conditions were created by the researchers. The scales were
designed as 5 point likert-type measures and were tested to ensure validity. These scales
were eventually expanded into the Groupthink Assessment Inventory detailed in depth in
Moorhead & Montanari (1989). Testing and analyses revealed that the underlying
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concepts of some of the antecedent conditions were closely related to what Janis had
proposed but, for the sake of simplicity, the three factor that explained the most variance
(cohesion, insulation and leadership) were used. Analyses of the symptoms however
revealed that there was significant similarity in some of the underlying concepts.
Therefore, the symptoms were distilled into four factors utilized in the study. These were:
Invulnerability (illusion of invulnerability and negative perception of non-group
individuals), Group Morality (inherent feelings of group morality and
unanimity/rationalization), Self-Censorship and Discouraged Dissent (pressure on
dissenters and negative view of dissenters). Defects in decision making underwent a
similar process resulting in two distinct factors, Few Alternatives (# of alternatives
discussed and lack of consideration regarding contingencies) and Lack of Expert Advice
(rejection of outside expertise and selective bias in use of information). Antecedent
conditions not manipulated were controlled via experimental conditions (ex. Use of
extreme time constraint on decision making). As with numerous other studies in this
realm, the sample consisted of students recruited from business policy classes. These
students were arranged into team of 3-5 for an overall team count of 45. It is useful to
note here that all the teams had previously worked together in a competitive simulation
over the course of 3 months and were therefore familiar with one another. Because the
data procured from this study was cross-sectional, the researchers decided to carry out a
path analysis instead of an ANOVA/MANOVA typically seen in the aforementioned
studies. The use of path analysis also allowed the researchers to get a better idea of the
causal relationships between the antecedent conditions, symptoms and decision making
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defects. The results showed that the most significant antecedent condition was insulation.
The groups that rated themselves highest on this category had the lowest performance.
The other antecedent conditions failed to show any noticeable effects on performance.
All the antecedent conditions did, however, have an impact on symptoms and defects.
Cohesion had a negative correlation with self-censorship and the defect of alternatives as
well as positive correlation with discouragement of dissent. Insulation was negatively
correlated with invulnerability and rejection of expert advice and positively correlated
with the proposal of alternatives. Leadership was positively correlated with morality and
discouraging dissent and negatively correlated with the defect of alternatives. These
results showed mixed support for the groupthink model. Some of the results, such as the
positive correlation between leadership and morality/discouraging dissent, reinforce the
theory. On the other hand, the results also directly contradict the relationships that Janis
proposed, such as the negative correlation between cohesion and self-censorship. Despite
this, the study holds merit as one of the most comprehensive tests of groupthink, focusing
on all four levels of the theory. Furthermore, even if they do not match Janis’ theory, the
causal relationships seen between each of the four levels provided some support for the
framework of groupthink. The study was also groundbreaking in that the nature of
cohesion among the groups (based on longer term relationships among group members as
seen in Janis’ case studies) is far more similar to the cohesion described by Janis.

Turner et Al (1992) attempted to build on previous empirical studies of
groupthink, most notably Callaway & Esser (1984) and Flowers (1977), in order to get a
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better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of groupthink. In particular, the
researchers tried to reconcile the conflicting results seen in previous groupthink research.
The researchers hypothesized that poor decision making attributable to groupthink should
only occur in groups with high external threat and high cohesion (i.e. those with all the
antecedent conditions of groupthink present, the “strict” hypothesis). They also note two
possible hypotheses in relation to decision quality, the “additive” hypothesis (addition of
more antecedent conditions lead to poorer decisions being made and the “liberal”
hypothesis (takes into account unique factors present in each situational context). The
researchers note that these hypotheses are applicable in the case of symptoms and
decision making defects as well. To test this, Turner and her colleagues carried out three
separate experiments. The first experiment was a basic test of the groupthink theory using
a 2 x 2 design with group cohesion and external threat as the independent variables. The
sample was comprised of 180 students, arranged into groups of 3. Threat was
manipulated by telling groups in the high threat condition that they were being
videotaped and that poorly performing groups would be used as part of a training
program. High cohesion groups were given name tags identifying them with a certain
group and engaged in a short pre-experimental discussion of their similarities. Decision
quality and self reports of symptoms and decision making defects served as dependent
variables. Results showed that groups in the high cohesion/high threat category and low
cohesion/low threat category produced the poorest quality decisions. Cohesion and threat
had mixed effects on groupthink symptoms. Most interestingly high cohesion resulted in
decreased self censorship, a direct contradiction of Janis’ theory. Results as per decision

38

WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED

making defects were also inconclusive. This points to the existence of the “liberal”
hypothesis of groupthink as opposed to the “strict” or “additive” one. The researchers
interpreted the results as supportive of what they term “social identity maintenance”, an
underlying mechanism of groupthink in which members strive to preserve their
affirmative view of group functioning. The second experiment was an expansion of the
manipulation check to ensure that cohesion had properly been induced. The sample used
consisted of 72 students assigned into groups of 3. Cohesion served as the independent
variable and was manipulated using methods similar to those in the first experiment.
Self-report scales of cohesion acted as the dependent variables. Results showed that the
cohesion manipulation had produced higher scores on the cohesion scales. With these
results as well as social identity maintenance in mind, the third and final experiment
aimed to replicate as well as extend the pilot study. In order to further test social identity
maintenance, the experimenters included manipulation of “distraction” as well. This
distraction consisted of music being played in the background during group discussions,
which in theory would provide an excuse for potentially faulty decision making and
thereby prevent group members from having to unconsciously carry out detrimental
behaviors to preserve their positive image of the group’s decision making process.
Cohesion was held constant in this study by giving all groups the high cohesion
manipulation from experiment 1. Therefore, threat and distraction served as the
independent variables. The same dependent variables used in the first experiment
(decision quality, symptoms of groupthink and defects in decision making) were carried
over. Results were consistent with experiment 1 in that groups with high external threat
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performed the worst, notably though groups with high threats and a present distraction
performed noticeably better. As cohesion was not manipulated here, results for symptoms
of groupthink and defects in decision making were ambiguous. Overall, this experiment
succeeded in replicating the results of the initial experiment in that high threat/high
cohesion led to the lowest decision quality, as well as supporting the social identity
maintenance mechanism. As a whole, the study enables a deeper look at the underlying
functions of groupthink. The lack of support for the additive and strict hypotheses might
also lead to a questioning of the causal sequence inherent in groupthink framework as per
Janis (1982) as well as Moorhead & Montanari (1986, 1989).

Bernthal & Insko (1993) looked at one of the most conflicted aspects of
groupthink research, group cohesion. The researchers sought to investigate the mixed
support seen for Janis’ (1972,1982) assertion that group cohesion was the single most
important antecedent condition for groupthink. In order to do this, the researchers made a
key distinction between “task-oriented cohesion” and “social-emotional cohesion”.
Task-oriented cohesion represents a drive to accomplish the objectives and tasks given to
the group. Social-emotional cohesion denotes maintenance of social relationships among
group members as most important to the group. The researchers note that the
manipulation of cohesion in prior studies, such as Callaway & Esser (1984), is mainly a
manipulation of task-oriented cohesion as participants are typically told that they were
matched with the fellow group members in order to maximize performance of the task
given, thereby at least partially explaining mixed support for the groupthink model.
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Based on this, the two hypotheses were that groupthink symptoms would be least
probable in highly task-cohesive groups and most probable in highly social-emotional
cohesive groups. The sample consisted of 138 female undergraduate students from the
University of Carolina Chapel Hill. The decision to use only female students may seem
rather odd and could lead to a bias in the results as seen in previous studies such as Kroon
et Al (1992), which noted that the composition of groups based on gender could have an
effect on groupthink symptoms. In other words, homogeneity in terms of sex of the group
members could affect cohesion, however, as cohesion was controlled in this study this
may not have a noticeable effect on the results. The participants were split into 46 groups
of three. Participants started by answering two falsified tests supposedly measuring social
and problem-solving skills. Upon completion they underwent a training condition in
which they were trained to use one of three decision making cues. These cues were used
so that in the following stage (completion of a decision-making task), the experimenter
could induce conflict by having at least 1 group member utilize a different cue than the
rest of the group. The two variables to be manipulated were task-cohesion and
social-emotional cohesion. This was done by telling groups that they had performed well
on either of the pre-experimental questionnaires for the high conditions or that they had
performed poorly for the low conditions. The dependent variable was a self rating of
factors influencing group cohesion. Results showed an interaction effect between the
social confidence measure (related to social antecedents of groupthink such as the illusion
of invulnerability and belief in inherent morality of the group). In particular groups in the
high task-cohesive/low social-emotional cohesive condition saw the lowest scores of
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social confidence, suggesting a low susceptibility to groupthink. There was also a main
effect of social-emotional cohesion such that groups with high social-emotional cohesion
had high ratings of social confidence. On the flip side, highly task-cohesive groups
showed high task focus, which could counteract the effects of groupthink. The
researchers note here that both high social-emotional cohesive groups and high task
cohesive groups rated higher confidence in their decisions, but also state that it is likely a
different form of confidence with the task cohesive groups acknowledging that individual
members might hold conflicting views and opinions. Bernthal & Insko’s study is crucial
in that it investigates the core aspect of Janis’ groupthink model and offers a partial
explanation why empirical research of groupthink has produced such mixed results. Apart
from differentiating between forms of cohesion, the researchers also acknowledge that
the cohesion seen in Janis’ case studies as well as most qualitative studies of groupthink
might be fundamentally different from what has been replicated by empirical research on
the field.

Park (2000) marks yet another attempt to comprehensively test the groupthink
model. Park starts by establishing the discrepancy in groupthink research and
summarizing all the available research at the time. This was put into a table which is
included in the appendix (Figure 3.). The sample used in the study was comprised of 256
students at the University of Pittsburgh. The participants underwent random assignment
and were put into 64 groups of four. The groups were given both verbal and written
instructions (pertaining to their role and condition) and were then given 50 minutes to
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carry out a decision making task. The task was based on a real life story published in the
Wall Street Journal concerning executives at a nuclear energy company. In order to test
the sharing of information, specific pieces of information were only given to group
members in certain roles. A monetary incentive for performance was advertised to the
groups in order to encourage participation, however Park acknowledges that this could’ve
also affected the groupthink process by encouraging better decision making
procedures.Participants were encouraged act as themselves rather than play a role. All the
factors present in the groupthink model were measured using a number of methods
ranging from self-report measures to content analyses of video recordings. Park paid
particular attention to the causal relationships between factors. Results supported the
causal sequence of the model. Antecedents showed strongest effects on the symptoms,
the symptoms showed strongest effects on defects of decision making and defects of
decision making showed strong effects on decision quality. However, it must also be
noted that the relationship between the antecedents and the defects of decision making
were also significant, which is not supportive of the model’s causal sequence. A deeper
look into the relationships reveals that only seven individual factors have significant
relationships (group cohesiveness, style of leadership, lack of procedure, low self esteem,
illusion of invulnerability, illusion of inherent group morality and failure to examine
risks). The antecedent conditions saw the most support, with all conditions having
significant relationships. However on two symptoms and one defect were statistically
significant. Park acknowledges that there were severe limitations in this study. The most
glaring one is the failure to control group cohesion. All groups used in this study were ad
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hoc, thereby failing to meet the cardinal antecedent for groupthink. Park says that the
study is still valid as this is typical of decision making groups in the real world, however
it is not sufficient when testing the theory of groupthink. Regardless there is still merit to
this study in it’s review of existing research as well as its implications for future research.

Criticism of the Groupthink Model

As with any theory, the groupthink model has had its fair share of detractors. Longley and
Pruitt (1980) commented on the dearth of empirical support and recommended a clearer definition
of the model. McCauley (1989) detracted from the importance janis placed on cohesiveness and
suggested compliance as a mechanism instead. Some of the most comprehensive yet scathing
criticisms of groupthink have come from Fuller & Aldag (1993, 1998).

Fuller & Aldag (1993) takes a critical look at the groupthink proposition. Noting the
evidence provided by empirical, case and conceptual studies, they comment that primary support
for the model has come from retrospective case studies. They also note the hodge-podge nature of
empirical groupthink research; the selection of variables that researchers use seems rather
arbitrary. General support for groupthink is spotty at best and difficult to determine due to the
lack of research. It is also noted that no study has adequately and fully tested the groupthink
model. According to their findings, the most consistently supported variable in the model is the
antecedent condition of leadership style. Fuller and Aldag in particular criticize the use of only
“fiascoes” in groupthink research. They see this as allowing a dangerous generalization of the
phenomenon. They also summarize all the suggested additions to the groupthink model that have
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been seen in research. These are power of the leader (Flowers, 1977), nature of the task (Callaway
& Esser, 1984) and stage of group development (Leana, 1985). They incorporate these factors as
well as others taken from related research to create the General Group Problem Solving Model
(GGPS). It is not the purpose of this paper to investigate said model but a diagram detailing the
model has been included in the appendix (Figure 2.) for reference purposes. They state that this
model is far more suited to investigating group decision making than Janis’ (1972,1982)
Groupthink Model. Fuller & Aldag suggest research into their GGPS model, but also note that it
may be too complex (an issue also seen with Groupthink). They also note that longitudinal studies
could be a useful tool in this area.

Fuller & Aldag (1998) put forth a far more scathing review of groupthink. The authors
literally demonize groupthink, regaling readers with a fable of the mythical monster “gruffthing”.
Using this fabricated folk tale, they illustrate their frustrations with the preoccupation of the
research community with the groupthink model. In particular they note that tendency for
researchers to see any factor of the groupthink model as indicative of groupthink being
responsible for bad decisions. It should be noted here that Janis (1972, 1982) did note that
groupthink was only one of many possible mechanisms that could lead to bad decision making.
Fuller & Aldag once again bring up the dearth of evidence supporting the model and lament its
presence in the foreground of group decision making literature. They even note that it has seeped
into daily life, with numerous news articles being written about the application of groupthink to
various situations. In particular they state no evidence for the “strong” or strict model of
groupthink and state that this had led to researchers testing “weak” versions and therefore finding
partial support. Several other criticisms they present range from an over reliance on concurrence
seeking, which they see as merely being adopted by the groupthink model from previous
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research, to the assertion that groupthink is antecedent to poor decision making, which they see as
due to the fact that the model includes “all the bad things” that could lead to faulty decision
making. They note that groupthink has succeeded in stimulating group decision making research
but has cost numerous resources which could have been devoted to the study of processes outside
the groupthink model.

Overall, Fuller & Aldag do bring up some notable and valid criticism, but oftentimes
seem to get too caught up in their frustration with the groupthink model. In particular they note
that warnings to improve research in the area have been ignored. This seems to be the case as the
community seems to have forgotten the most key component of the groupthink model according
to Janis (1972, 1982), cohesion.

Why Empirical Groupthink Research has Failed

As noted by Janis (1982, 1972), cohesion among the group members is the cardinal
antecedent condition of groupthink. Without it, groupthink cannot occur. The rest of the factors
are merely additive and probabilistic in that they need not be present but increase the likelihood
of groupthink when they are. Almost all empirical studies of groupthink acknowledge the role
played by cohesion, but none have been able to replicate as per the groupthink model.

It is typical in groupthink research for cohesion to be manipulated as a variable. Typically
this is done by simply telling the participants in high cohesion conditions that they are a good
“fit”. This can be seen in studies such as Callaway & Esser (1984), Turner et al (1992), Courtright
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(1978) and Flowers (1977). Others have attempted to control for cohesion in order to test other
factors of the model. This includes studies such as Callaway, Marriott & Esser (1985). Most
strangely, some, such as Park (2000), have even just ignored cohesion all together. Overall, not a
single study has come close to replicating the form of cohesion described by Janis (1972, 1982) in
his case studies. The cohesion in the groups in Janis’ case study, as well as in other case studies
like Hensley & Griffin (1984), was based on bonds formed over years of working together. The
members of these groups knew each other on a far more personal level in addition to having
worked together for far longer. This cohesion cannot be replicated by merely telling participants
that they were a good match. The closest an empirical study has gotten to replicating this level of
cohesion has been in Leana (1985). The use of groups that had been working together for a
semester was far closer to being cohesive than the ad hoc groups used in other studies. A similar
technique was used by Moorhead & Montanari (1986) as well. On average both these studies
have shown somewhat stronger support for the model than others, suggesting that this could
possibly be the key to providing empirical support for the groupthink model. It should also be
noted that Bernthal & Insko (1993) distinction between task-oriented and social-emotional
cohesion could factor into the the role of cohesion.

Suggestions for Future Research

Clearly, it is necessary to accurately portray the type of cohesion Janis (1982,1972) used
in his model in order to attempt to empirically support the groupthink model. One possible
solution to this would be to use groups which had existed over a longer period of time in the high
cohesion condition. These participants could be formed using decision making group that have
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existed for at least a 3 year period. Applying this to the high cohesion condition in a replication of
Moorhead & Montanari (1986) could be highly beneficial to the future of groupthink research.
Such a study is briefly detailed below.

As stated before, Moorhead & Montanari (1986) represents one of the most
comprehensive tests of groupthink thus far. Park (2000) could also be chosen, but falls
significantly short due to its use of only ad hoc groups. In particular, the comprehensive testing
procedure used by Moorhead & Montanari is detailed and expanded in their later publication,
Moorhead & Montanari (1989). This article details the creation of the Groupthink Assessment
Inventory. The inventory was created by the researchers for the purpose of providing a complete
measure of the entire groupthink model. Most of the scales were developed from scratch as there
were no existing scales available for many of the groupthink factors at the time. A validation
study was carried out in order to ensure the model was robust. Factor analysis of the scales
measuring each variable showed that numerous variables were correlated and therefore they were
distilled into a more testable yet comprehensive measure of groupthink. Therefore the Groupthink
Assessment Inventory is not a perfect match to the original groupthink model, but can still
provide insight into its functioning. In particular, several symptoms and defects were combined
within their respective categories to form new factors. A table detailing the factors is included in
the appendix. The Groupthink Assessment Inventory was developed in a slightly more
rudimentary form for use in Moorhead & Montanari (1986) and therefore does not need much
modification in order to be utilized. The most important factor would be the use of long-term
groups as opposed to the semester long workgroups used in the study. To accurately represent a
situation similar to what Janis theorized, a simulation like the “Tycoon” game used by Gladstein
& Reilly (1985) could be used. Expected results from a path analysis would be a confirmation of
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the causal sequence seen in the groupthink model, notably a significant effect of the antecedent
conditions on the symptoms of groupthink and a significant effect of the symptoms on the defects
in decision making. Furthermore, the directional relationships between the factors would be
closer to those put forth in the model. Antecedent conditions should be positively linked to
symptoms which should be positively linked to the defects in decision making.

As noted by Fuller & Aldag (1993), a longitudinal study could also be utilized for the
study of groupthink. A possibility for this could be applying the same study detailed above, based
on Moorhead & Montanari (1986), longitudinally to a set of decision making groups. This might
allow us to witness how the presence of groupthink factors could change as the groups become
more and more cohesive, it would also allow for control of extraneous variables.

It is clear that the field of groupthink has a long way to go. It is my hope that researchers
take note of the issues described above in order to more conclusively test Janis’ (1972, 1982)
groupthink model. Until then criticism of the groupthink model, especially that concerning the
lack of empirical evidence, must be taken with a grain of salt.
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Appendix

Figure 1. The Revised Groupthink Model. Adapted from Groupthink (p. 244), by I. L.
Janis, 1982, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Copyright 1982 by Houghton Mifflin Company

54

WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED

Figure 2. The GGPS Model. Adapted from “Beyond Fiasco: A reappraisal of the
groupthink phenomenon and a new model of group decision processes”, by R. J. Aldag
and S. R. Fuller, 1993, Psychological Bulletin, 113(3), p. 544, Copyright 1993 by
American Psychological Association.
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Figure 3. Review of Groupthink Research. Reprinted from “A Comprehensive Empirical
Investigation of the Relationships among Variables of the Groupthink Model”, by W.
Park, 2000, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21(8), p. 874, Copyright 2000 by John
Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
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